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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a new model for pricing financial derivatives subject to collateralization. It 
allows for collateral arrangements adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, the model can back out the 
market price of a collateralized contract. This framework is very useful for valuing outstanding 
derivatives. Using a unique dataset, we find empirical evidence that credit risk alone is not overly 
important in determining credit-related spreads. Only accounting for both collateral posting and credit risk 
can sufficiently explain unsecured credit costs. This finding suggests that failure to properly account for 
collateralization may result in significant mispricing of derivatives. We also empirically gauge the impact 
of collateral agreements on risk measurements. Our findings indicate that there are important interactions 
between market and credit risk.  
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Collateral arrangements are regulated by the Credit Support Annex (CSA) and are always counterparty-
based as different counterparties may have different CSA agreements. Thus, financial institutions 
normally group derivatives into counterparty portfolios first and then process them separately. The 
difference between counterparties is determined by counterparty credit qualities whereas the difference in 
collateralization is distinguished by the terms and conditions of CSA agreements. 
Collateralization is a critical component of the plumbing of the financial system. The use of 
collateral in financial markets has increased sharply over the past decade, yet analytical and empirical 
research on collateralization is relatively sparse. The effect of collateralization on valuation and risk is an 
understudied area. 
Due to the complexity of collateralization, the literature seems to turn away from direct and 
detailed modeling. For example, Johannes and Sundaresan [2007], and Fuijii and Takahahsi [2012] model 
collateralization via a cost-of-collateral instantaneous rate. Piterbarg [2010] regards collateral as a regular 
asset and uses the replication approach to price collateralized derivatives. 
Contrary to previous studies, we present a model that characterizes a collateral process directly 
based on the fundamental principal and legal structure of CSA. The model is devised that allows for 
collateralization adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, it can back out price changes due to counterparty 
risk and collateral posting. Our model is very useful for valuing off-the-run or outstanding derivatives. 
This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of collateralization by 
addressing several essential questions. First, how does collateralization affect swap rate?  
Interest rate swaps collectively account for two-thirds of all outstanding derivatives (see 
FinPricing). An ISDA mid-market swap rate is based on a mid-day polling. Dealers use this market rate 
as a reference and make some adjustments to quote an actual swap rate. The adjustment or swap premium 
is determined by many factors, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, funding cost, operational cost and 
expected profit, etc.  
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Unlike generic mid-market swap rates, swap premia are determined in a competitive market 
according to the basic principles of supply and demand. A swap client first contacts a number of swap 
dealers for a quotation and then chooses the most competitive one. If a premium is too low, the dealer 
may lose money. If a premium is too high, the dealer may lose the competitive advantage. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the detailed allocation of a swap premium, i.e., what percentage 
of the adjustment is charged for each factor. Thus, a direct empirical assessment of the impact of 
collateralization on swap rate is impossible.  
To circumvent this difficulty, this article uses an indirect empirical approach. We define a swap 
premium spread as the premium difference between two swap contracts that have exactly the same terms 
and conditions but are traded with different CSA counterparties. We reasonably believe that if two 
contracts are identical except counterparties, the swap premium spread should reflect counterparty credit 
risk only, as all other risks/costs are identical.  
Empirically, we obtain a unique proprietary dataset from an investment bank. We use these data 
and a statistical measurement 
2R  to examine whether credit risk and collateralization, alone or in 
combination, are sufficient to explain market swap premium spreads. We first study the marginal impact 
of credit risk. Since credit default swap (CDS) premium theoretically reflects the credit risk of a firm, we 
use the market swap premium spreads as the response variable and the CDS premium differences between 
two counterparties as the explanatory variable. The estimation result shows that the adjusted 
2R  is 0.7472, 
implying that approximately 75% of market spreads can be explained by counterparty credit risk. In other 
words, counterparty risk alone can provide a good but not overwhelming prediction on spreads. 
We then assess the joint effect. Because implied or model-generated spreads take into account 
both counterparty risk and collateralization, we assign the model-implied spreads as the explanatory 
variable and the market spreads as the response variable. The new adjusted 
2R  is 0.9906, suggesting that 
counterparty risk and collateralization together have high explanatory power on premium spreads. The 
finding leads to practical implications, such as collateralization modeling allows forecasting credit spread. 
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Second, how does collateralization affect counterparty credit risk? Credit value adjustment (CVA) 
is the most prominent measurement in counterparty credit risk. We select all the CSA counterparty 
portfolios in the dataset and then compute their CVAs. We find that the CVA of a collateralized 
counterparty portfolio is always smaller than the one of the same portfolio without collateralization. We 
also find that credit risk is negatively correlated with collateralization as an increase in collateralization 
causes a decrease in credit risk. The empirical tests corroborate our theoretical conclusions that 
collateralization can reduce CVA charges and mitigate counterparty risk. 
Finally, how do collateralization and credit risk, either alone or in combination, impact market 
risk? How do they interact with each other? Value at risk (VaR) is the regulatory measurement for market 
risk We compute VaR in three different cases – VaR without taking credit risk into account, VaR with 
credit risk, and VaR with both credit risk and collateralization. We find that there is a positive correlation 
between market risk and credit risk as VaR increases after considering counterparty credit risk. We also 
find that collateralization and market risk have a negative correlation, i.e., collateral posting can actually 
reduce VaR. This finding contradicts the prevailing belief in the market that collateralization would 
increase market risk (see Collateral Management – Wikipedia). 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: First we present a new model for pricing 
collateralized financial derivatives. Then we discuss empirical evidences. Finally, the conclusions and 
discussion are provided. All proofs and detailed derivations are contained in the appendices. 
 
Pricing Collateralized Financial Derivatives 
A CSA is a legal document that regulates collateral posting. It specifies a variety of terms 
including threshold, independent amount, and minimum transfer amount (MTA). A threshold is the 
unsecured credit exposure that a party is willing to bear. A MTA is used to avoid the workload associated 
with a frequent transfer of insignificant collateral amounts. An independent amount plays the same role as 
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an initial margin or haircut. We define the effective collateral threshold as the threshold plus the MTA. 
Collateral is called as soon as the mark-to-market (MTM) value rises above the effective threshold.  
There are three types of collateralization: partial, over or full. A positive effective threshold 
corresponds to partial-collateralization where the posting of collateral is less than the MTM value. A 
negative effective threshold represents over-collateralization where the posting of collateral is greater than 
the MTM value. A zero-value effective threshold equates with full-collateralization where the posting of 
collateral is equal to the MTM value. Our generic model is applicable to all the types. 
Since the only reason for taking collateral is to reduce/eliminate credit risk, collateral analysis 
should be closely related to credit risk modeling. There are two primary types of models that attempt to 
describe default processes in the literature: structural models and reduced-form models. Many 
practitioners in the market have tended to gravitate toward the reduced-from models given their 
mathematical tractability and market consistency.  
We consider a filtered probability space ( , F ,   0ttF , P ) satisfying the usual conditions, 
where   denotes a sample space, F  denotes a  -algebra, P  denotes a probability measure, and 
 
0ttF  denotes a filtration. In the reduced-form framework, the stopping or default time   of a firm is 
modeled as a Cox arrival process whose first jump occurs at default and is defined by, 
  
t
s dssht
0
),(:inf      (1) 
where )(th  or ),( tth   denotes the stochastic hazard rate dependent on an exogenous common state t , 
and   is a unit exponential random variable independent of 
t .  
It is well-known that the survival probability from time t to s in this framework is defined by 




 
s
t
duuhtsPstp )(exp)|(:),(        (2a) 
 The default probability for the period (t, s) is given by 




 
s
t
duuhstptsPstq )(exp1),(1)|(:),(     (2b) 
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Let valuation date be t. Consider a financial contract that promises to pay a 0TX  at maturity 
date tT  , and nothing before the time. 
The binomial default rule considers only two possible states: default or survival. For a discrete 
one-payment period (t, T ) economy, at time T  the contract either defaults with the default probability 
),( Ttq  or survives with the survival probability ),( Ttp . The survival payoff is equal to 
TX  and the 
default payoff is a fraction of 
TX : TX , where   is the recovery rate. The value of this defaultable 
contract at time t is the discounted expectation of all the possible payoffs and is given by 
    tt FF TTN XTtITtDEXTtqTTtpTtDEtV ),(),(),()(),(),()(       (3) 
where  tE F  is the expectation conditional on tF ,  ),( TtD denotes the risk-free discount factor at time 
t for maturity T and  ),()(),(),( TtqTTtpTtI   can be regarded as a risk-adjusted discount ratio. 
Suppose that there is a CSA agreement between a bank and a counterparty in which the 
counterparty is required to deliver collateral when the mark-to-market (MTM) value arises over the 
effective threshold H.  
The choice of modeling assumptions for collateralization should be based on the legal structure of 
CSA. According to the Bankruptcy Law, if the demand for default payment exceeds the collateral value, 
the balance of the demand will be treated as an unsecured claim and subject to its pro rata distribution 
under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme (see Garlson [1991], Routh and Douglas [2005], and 
Edwards and Morrison [2005]). The default payment under a CSA can be mathematically expressed as 
  ))(1)(()()()()()( TTCXTTCXTTCTP TT
D         (4) 
where )(TC  is the collateral amount at T. 
It is worth noting that the default payment in equation (4) is always greater than the original 
recovery, i.e., T
D XTTP )()(   because )(T  is always less than 1. Said differently, the default payoff of 
a collateralized contract is always greater than the default payoff of the same contract without a CSA. 
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That is why the major benefit of collateralization should be viewed as an improved recovery in the event 
of a default. 
According to CSA, if the contract value )(tV C  is less than the effective threshold )(tH , no 
collateral is posted; otherwise, the required collateral is equal to the difference between the contract value 
and the effective threshold. The collateral amount posted at time t can be expressed mathematically as 
)0),()(max()( tHtVtC C       (5) 
where 0)( tH corresponds to full-collateralization; 0)( tH  represents partial-collateralization; and 
0)( tH  reflects over-collateralization. 
For a discrete one-payment period (t, T) economy, at time T, if the contract survives, the survival 
value is the promised payoff TX  and the collateral taker returns the collateral to the provider. If the 
contract defaults, the default payment is defined in (4) where the future value of the collateral is 
),(/)()( TtDtCTC  . Since the most predominant form of collateral is cash according to ISDA [2013], it 
is reasonable to consider the time value of money only for collateral assets. The large use of cash means 
that collateral is both liquid and not subject to large fluctuations in value. The above collateral rule tells us 
that collateral does not have any bearing on survival payoffs; instead, it takes effect on default payments 
only. The value of the CSA contract is the discounted expectation of all the payoffs and is given by 
   tFTTC XTtpTCXTTCTtqTtDEtV ),())()(()(),(),()(       (6) 
After some simple mathematics, we have the following proposition  
Proposition 1: The value of a collateralized single-payment contract is given by 
  ),(),()( TtGXTtFEtV TC  tF          (7a) 
where 
  ),(),(),(/11),(
)()()()(
TtDTtITtITtF
tHtVtHtV NN 
      (7b) 
  ),(/)(1),()(1),(
)()(
TtITTtqtHTtG
tHtV N


            (7c) 
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where  tF),(),( TtIETtI  . ),( TtI  and )(tV N  are defined in (3). 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
We may think of ),( TtF  as the CSA-adjusted discount factor and ),( TtG  as the cost of bearing 
unsecured credit risk. Proposition 1 tells us that the value of a collateralized contract is equal to the 
present value of the payoff discounted by the CSA-adjusted discount factor minus the cost of taking 
unsecured counterparty credit risk. This proposition theoretically demonstrates that collateral posting 
changes valuation. 
The pricing in Proposition 1 is relatively straightforward. We first compute )(tV N  and then test 
whether its value is greater than )(tH . After that, the calculations of ),( TtF , ),( TtG  and )(tV C  are 
easily obtained. 
We discuss a special case where 0)( tH corresponding to full-collateralization. Suppose that 
default probabilities are uncorrelated with interest rates and payoffs
2
. From Proposition 1, we can easily 
obtain )()( tVtV FC   where  tFTF XTtDEtV ),()(   is the risk-free value. That is to say: the value of a 
fully-collateralized contract is equal to the risk-free value. This conclusion is in line with the results of 
Johannes and Sundaresan [2007], Fuijii and Takahahsi [2012], and Piterbarg [2010]. 
Proposition 1 can be easily extended from single payment to multiple payments. Suppose that a 
defaultable contract has m cash flows represented as 
iX  with payment dates iT , where i = 1,…,m. We 
derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The value of a collateralized multiple-payment contract is given by 
              10 110 11 10 1 ),(),(),()( mi iiij jjmi iij jjC TTGTTFEXTTFEtV tt FF            (8a) 
                                   
2 Moody’s Investor’s Service [2000] presents statistics that suggest that the correlations between interest 
rates, default probabilities and recovery rates are very small and provides a reasonable comfort level for 
the uncorrelated assumption. 
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where 
  ),(),(),(/11),( 111)(),()(),(1 11    jjjjjjTHTTJTHTTJjj TTDTTITTITTF jjjjjj         (8b) 
  ),(/)(1),()(1),( 111)(),(1 1    jjjjjjTHTTJjj TTITTTqTHTTG jjj          (8c) 
 



   jTF11111 )(),(),(),( jj
C
jjjjjj XTVTTITTDETTJ     (8d) 
where 

 

1
0 1
1),(
i
j jj
TTF  is an empty product when 0i . Empty product allows for a much shorter 
mathematical presentation of many subjects. 
The valuation in Proposition 2 has a backward nature. The intermediate values are vital to 
determine the final price. For a payment period, the current price has a dependence on the future price. 
Only on the final payment date mT , the value of the contract and the maximum amount of information 
needed to determine ),( 1 mm TTJ  , ),( 1 mm TTF   and ),( 1 mm TTG   are revealed. This type of problem can be 
best solved by working backward in time, with the later value feeding into the earlier ones, so that the 
process builds on itself in a recursive fashion, which is referred to as backward induction. The most 
popular backward induction algorithms are lattice/tree and regression-based Monte Carlo, i.e., Longstaff-
Schwartz approach. 
 
Empirical Results 
Impact of collateralization on swap rate 
In this subsection, we choose interest rate swaps for our empirical study. Ultimately, it is the 
objective of this subsection to test if counterparty credit risk and collateralization are sufficient to explain 
market swap premium spreads. We choose a statistical measurement 
2R  to determine how much market 
spreads can be interpreted by model-implied spreads that take counterparty risk and collateralization into 
account.  
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Swap rate is the fixed rate that sets the market value of a swap at initiation to zero. ISDAFIX 
provides average mid-market swap rates based on a mid-day polling from a panel of dealers. In practice, 
the mid-market swap rates are generally not the actual swap rates transacted with counterparties, but are 
instead the benchmarks against which the actual swap rates are set. A swap dealer that arranges a contract 
and provides liquidity to the market involves costs. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the mid-market 
swap rate to cover various transacting expenses and also to provide a profit margin to the dealer. As a 
result, the actual price agreed for a transaction is not zero but a positive amount to the dealer.  
Unlike the generic benchmark swap rates, swap premia are determined according to the basic 
principles of supply and demand. The swap market is highly competitive. In a competitive market, prices 
are determined by the impersonal forces of demand and supply, but not by the manipulations of powerful 
buyers or sellers. 
Prior research has primarily focused on the generic mid-market swap rates and results appear 
puzzling. Sorensen and Bollier [1994] believe that swap spreads are partially determined by counterparty 
default risk. Whereas Duffie and Huang [1996], Minton [1997] and Grinblatt [2001] find weak or no 
evidence of the impact of counterparty credit risk on swap spreads. Collin-Dufresne and Solnik [2001] 
and He [2001] further argue that many credit enhancement devices, e.g., collateralization, have essentially 
rendered swap contracts risk-free. Meanwhile, Duffie and Singleton [1999], and Liu, Longstaff and 
Mandell [2006] conclude that both credit and liquidity risks have an impact on swap spreads. Moreover, 
Feldhutter and Lando [2008] find that the liquidity factor is the largest component of swap spreads. It 
seems that there is no clear-cut answer yet regarding the relative contribution of various factors. 
In contrast to previous research, this subsection mainly studies swap adjustments/premia related 
to credit risk and collateralization. It empirically measures the effect of collateralization on pricing and 
compares it with model-implied prices.  
A swap premium is supposed to cover the expected profit and all the expenses, including the cost 
of bearing unsecured credit risk. Unfortunately, however, we do not know what percentage of the market 
swap premium is allocated to the unsecured credit risk, which makes a direct verification impossible.  
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To circumvent this difficulty, we design an indirect verification process in which we select some 
CSA swap pairs such that the two contracts in each pair have exactly the same terms and conditions but 
are traded with different counterparties under different collateral agreements. It is reasonable to believe 
that the difference between the two contracts in each pair is solely attributed to collateralized counterparty 
credit risk, as all the other risks/costs are identical. Therefore, by accounting for credit risk and 
collateralization, we can efficiently compare the implied spreads with the market spreads for these pairs. 
We obtain a unique proprietary dataset from an investment bank. The dataset contains derivative 
contract data, counterparty data (including collateral agreements, recovery rates, etc), and market data. 
The trading dates are from May 6, 2005 to May 11, 2012. We find a total of 1002 swap pairs in the 
dataset, where the two contracts in each pair have the same terms and conditions but are traded with 
different CSA counterparties. We arbitrarily select one pair shown in Exhibit 1.  
 
Exhibit 1: A pair of 20-year swap contracts 
This exhibit displays the terms and conditions of two swap contracts that have different counterparties but 
are otherwise the same. We hide the counterparty names according to the security policy of the 
investment bank while everything else is authentic. 
 
Swap 1 Swap 2 
Fixed leg Floating leg Fixed leg Floating leg 
Counterparty X Y 
Effective date 15/09/2005 15/09/2005 15/09/2005 15/09/2005 
Maturity date 15/09/2025 15/09/2025 15/09/2025 15/09/2025 
Day count 30/360 ACT/360 30/360 ACT/360 
Payment frequency Semi-annually Quarterly Semi-annually Quarterly 
Swap rate 4.9042% - 4.9053% - 
Roll over Mod_follow Mod_follow Mod_follow Mod_follow 
Principal 25,000,000 25,000,000 25,000,000 25,000,000 
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Currency USD USD USD USD 
Pay/receive Bank receives Party X receives Bank receives Party Y receives 
Floating index - 3 month LIBOR - 3 month LIBOR 
Floating spread - 0 - 0 
Floating reset - Quarterly - Quarterly 
 
 
An interest rate curve is the term structure of interest rates, derived from observed market 
instruments that represent the most liquid and dominant interest rate products for certain time horizons. 
Normally the curve is divided into three parts. The short end of the term structure is determined using 
LIBOR rates. The middle part of the curve is constructed using Eurodollar futures. The far end is derived 
using mid swap rates. The LIBOR-future-swap curve is presented in Exhibit 2. After bootstrapping the 
curve, we get the continuously compounded zero rates. 
 
Exhibit 2: USD LIBOR-future-swap curve 
This exhibit displays the closing mid prices as of September 15, 2005 
Instrument Name Price 
September 21 2005 LIBOR 3.6067% 
September 2005 Eurodollar 3 month 96.1050 
December 2005 Eurodollar 3 month 95.9100 
March 2006 Eurodollar 3 month 95.8100 
June 2006 Eurodollar 3 month 95.7500 
September 2006 Eurodollar 3 month 95.7150 
December 2006 Eurodollar 3 month 95.6800 
2 year swap rate 4.2778% 
3 year swap rate 4.3327% 
4 year swap rate 4.3770% 
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5 year swap rate 4.4213% 
6 year swap rate 4.4679% 
7 year swap rate 4.5120% 
8 year swap rate 4.5561% 
9 year swap rate 4.5952% 
10 year swap rate 4.6368% 
12 year swap rate 4.7089% 
15 year swap rate 4.7957% 
20 year swap rate 4.8771% 
25 year swap rate 4.9135% 
 
As the payoffs of an interest rate swap are determined by interest rates, we need to model the 
evolution of floating rates. Interest rate models are based on evolving either short rates, instantaneous 
forward rates, or market forward rates. Since both short rates and instantaneous forward rates are not 
directly observable in the market, the models based on these rates have difficulties in expressing market 
views and quotes, and lack agreement with market valuation formulas for basic derivatives. On the other 
hand, the object modeled under the Libor Market Model (LMM) is market-observable. It is also 
consistent with the market standard approach for pricing caps/floors using Black’s formula. They are 
generally considered to have more desirable theoretical calibration properties than short rate or 
instantaneous forward rate models. Therefore, we choose the LMM lattice proposed by Xiao [2011] for 
pricing collateralized swaps. 
According to Proposition 2, we also need counterparty-related information, such as recovery rates, 
hazard rates and collateral thresholds. The CDS premia and recovery rates are given in Exhibit 3 and the 
collateral thresholds and MTAs of the CSA agreements are displayed in Exhibit 4. We can compute the 
hazard rates via a standard calibration process (see J.P. Morgan [2001]). 
 
Exhibit 3: CDS premia and recovery rates 
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This exhibit displays the closing CDS premia as of September 15, 2005 and recovery rates 
Counterparty name Bank Company X Company Y 
6 month CDS spread 0.00031 0.000489 0.000808 
1 year CDS spread 0.000333 0.00056 0.001017 
2 year CDS spread 0.000516 0.000866 0.00154 
3 year CDS spread 0.000664 0.001147 0.002114 
4 year CDS spread 0.000848 0.00147 0.002768 
5 year CDS spread 0.001012 0.001783 0.003439 
7 year CDS spread 0.001334 0.002289 0.004283 
10 year CDS spread 0.001727 0.002952 0.005281 
15 year CDS spread 0.001907 0.003283 0.005814 
20 year CDS spread 0.002023 0.003266 0.006064 
30 year CDS spread 0.002021 0.00336 0.006461 
Recovery rate 0.39213 0.35847 0.33872 
 
 
Exhibit 4: CSA agreement 
This exhibit provides the collateral thresholds and MTAs under the CSA agreements. 
CSA agreement 1 2 
Counterparty name Bank Company X Bank Company Y 
Threshold 0 0 0 0 
MTA 500000 500000 500000 500000 
 
 
Given the above information, we are able to compute the collateralized swap rates. We first use 
the LMM to evolve the interest rates and then determine the associated CSA-adjusted discount factors as 
well as the cost of bearing unsecured credit risk according to Proposition 2. Finally, we calculate the 
collateralized swap rates via a backward induction method. The results are given in Exhibit 5. 
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Exhibit 5: Swap rate results 
This exhibit presents the model-implied swap rates and premia as well as the dealer-quoted market swap 
rates and premia, where Swap premium (in bps)  = Swap rate – Generic swap rate, and Premium spread = 
Premium of swap 2 – Premium of swap 1. 
 
Swap 1 Swap 2 
Premium spread 
Generic 
swap rate Swap rate Premium Swap rate Premium 
Model-implied 0.048780 0.09 bps 0.048790 0.19 bps 0.10 bps 
0.048771 
Dealer quoted 0.049042 2.71 bps 0.049053 2.82 bps 0.11 bps 
 
The 20-year generic mid-market swap rate is 0.048771 shown in Exhibit 2. The swap rates of 
contracts 1 and 2 are given in Exhibit 1 as 0.049042 and 0.049053. Accordingly, the market swap premia 
are 2.71 (0.049042 - 0.048771) basis points (bps) and 2.82 (0.049053 - 0.048771) bps. These premia are 
charged for many expenses. Although we do not know what percentage of the premia are allocated to 
cover the unsecured credit risks, we reasonably believe that the market premium spread, 0.11 (= 2.82 – 
2.71) bps in Exhibit 5, should solely reflect the difference between the two counterparties’ unsecured 
credit risks, as other factors are identical. 
By accounting for both credit risk and collateralization, we calculate the model-implied swap 
rates as 0.048780 and 0.048790 shown in Exhibit 5. Consequently, the model-implied swap premia are 
0.09 bps and 0.19 bps. The results imply that only a small portion of a swap premium is attributed to 
unsecured credit risk. Intuitively the small impact of credit risk and collateral posting on a swap premium 
is mainly due to 1) only the swap coupons rather than the national amount are exposed to counterparty 
risk; 2) the initial swap rate sets the contract value close to zero and there is only 50% chance to develop 
counterpart risk; 3) collateralization mitigates credit risk. This would certainly not be the case for other 
derivatives. The result is in line with the findings of Duffie and Huang [1996], Duffie and Singleton 
[1999], and Minton [1997].  
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Exhibit 5 shows that the model-implied spread is quite close to the dealer-quoted spread, 
suggesting that the model is fairly accurate in pricing collateralized financial instruments. 
Repeating this exercise for the remaining pairs, we find that the model-implied spreads fluctuate 
randomly around the market spreads. We refer to the differences between the model-implied premium 
spreads and the market quoted premium spreads as the model-market premium spread differentials. The 
summary statistics of the market spreads, the model-implied spreads, and the model-market spread 
differentials are presented in Exhibit 6. It shows that the average of the model-market spread differentials 
is only -0.03 bps, which can be partly attributed to noise. The results indicate prima facie that the model 
performs quite well. The empirical tests corroborate the theoretical prediction on premium spreads. 
 
Exhibit 6: Summary statistics of model-implied swap premium spreads, market swap premium 
spreads and model-market swap premium spread differentials 
All values are displayed in bps. Model-market swap premium spread differential = Model-implied swap 
premium spread – Market-quoted swap premium spread. 
 Max Min Mean Median Std 
Market quoted swap premium spreads 3.08 -5.25 -0.46 -0.15 1.80 
Model-implied swap premium spreads 2.10 -5.33 -0.44 0.03 1.73 
Model-market premium spread differentials 0.99 -1.18 -0.03 0.05 0.46 
 
Next, we examine the effects of credit risk and collateralization, alone or combined, on swap 
premium spreads. First, we study the marginal effect of credit risk. For each swap pair, we obtain the 
counterparty CDS premia. Presumably, the differences in CDS premia should mainly represent the 
differences in counterparty risk. To determine the strength of the statistical relationship between market 
premium spreads and counterparty risk, we present the estimate of the following regression model. 
 bXaY      (9) 
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where Y is the market swap premium spread, X is the difference between the counterparty CDS premia, a 
is the intercept, b is the slope, and   is the regression residual. 
The results of this regression are shown in Exhibit 7. It can be seen that the adjusted 
2R  is 0.7472, 
implying that approximately 74% of market premium spreads can be explained by credit risk alone. We 
provide empirical evidence that counterparty credit risk alone plays a significant but not overwhelming 
role in determining credit-related spreads when contracts are under collateral agreements. Moreover, the 
slope is 0.0127, suggesting that a CDS spread of about 100 bps translates into a swap spread of about 1.27 
bps. Finally the small p-value indicates that the changes in CDS premia are closely related to the changes 
in market premium spreads. 
 
Exhibit 7: Marginal credit risk regression results 
This exhibit presents the regression results for the following regression model: 
 MarketSwapPremiumSpreads = a + b * DifferencesBetweenCounterpartyCDSs +  ε 
where the market swap premium spreads are used as the dependent variable and the differences between 
the counterparty CDS premia as the explanatory variable. 
Slope Intercept Adjusted 
2R  Significance F T value P value 
0.0127 -2.7E-04 0.7472 1.1E-05 18.6 1.51E-66 
 
 
According to ISDA Margin Survey (ISDA [2013], 73.7% of OTC derivatives are subject to 
collateral agreements. For large firms, the figure is 80.7%. Accounting for collateralization has become 
increasingly important in pricing OTC derivatives. Since the implied spreads generated by our model take 
into account both credit risk and collateralization, the statistical relationship between the market spreads 
and the model-implied spreads should refer to the joint effect of counterparty credit risk and 
collateralization on market spreads. Thus, we present another regression model where the market spreads 
are regressed on the implied spreads. The regression results are shown in Exhibit 8. 
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Exhibit 8: Credit risk and collateralization combined regression results 
This exhibit presents the regression results for the following regression model: 
  MarketSwapPremiumSpreads = a + b * ImpliedSwapPremiumSpreads + ε 
where the market swap premium spreads are used as the dependent variable and the model-implied swap 
premium spreads as the explanatory variable. 
Slope Intercept Adjusted 
2R  Significance F T value P value 
0.9857 4.48E-05 0.9906 3.21E-08 25.4 3.16E-110 
 
Exhibit 8 shows that the adjusted  
2R  value is 0.9906, implying that approximately 99% of the 
market spreads can be explained by the implied spreads. Also the small p-value suggests that the changes 
in implied spreads are strongly related to the changes in market spreads.  
The empirical results shed light on the economic and statistical significance of collateralization. 
The increase in the explanatory power of swap premium spreads bears an interesting finding: It seems that 
credit risk alone has a modest explanatory power on premium spreads. Only the combination of credit risk 
and collateralization can sufficiently explain them. 
 
Impact of collateralization on credit risk 
In this subsection, we study how collateralization affects credit risk by measuring CVA changes 
due to collateral posting. CVA is the market price of counterparty credit risk that has become a central 
part of counterparty credit risk management.  
From the same dataset above, we find that there are a total of 3052 counterparties having live 
trades as of May 11, 2012. 516 of them have CSA agreements. We randomly select one counterparty 
portfolio that contains 476 interest rate swaps, 36 interest rate swaptions and 223 interest rate caps/floors. 
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First, we compute the risk-free value 702,737,2FV  that is relatively straightforward as the risk-free 
portfolio value is what trading systems or pricing models normally report.  
Second, we assume that there is counterparty credit risk but no collateral agreement. Based on the 
pricing model proposed by Xiao [2015], we compute the risky value of the portfolio as 014,688,2NV
after considering counterparty credit risk. By definition, the CVA without collateralization is equal to 
.688,49 NFN VVCVA  
Next, we further assume that there is a CSA agreement in which the threshold is 2 million and the 
MTA is 100,000. The risky value of the portfolio is calculated as 094,725,2CV  according to 
Proposition 2. The CVA with collateralization is given by 608,12 CFC VVCVA . Similarly, we 
can compute the CVAs under different collateral arrangements and present the results in Exhibit 9.  
 
Exhibit 9. Impact of Collateralization on CVA 
This exhibit shows that CVA increases with collateral threshold. The infinite collateral threshold is 
equivalent to no collateral agreement and the zero-value collateral threshold corresponds to full 
collateralization. An increase in collateral threshold leads to a decrease in collateralization. 
Effective Threshold  0 2.1 Million 4.1 Million 6.1 Million 8.1 Mil Infinite ( ) 
CVA 0 12,608 23,685 33,504 42,254 49,688 
 
Exhibit 9 tells us that collateral posting can reduce CVA. Full collateralization makes a portfolio 
appear to be risk-free. An increase in collateral threshold leads to a rise in unsecured credit exposure, and 
thereby an increase in CVA. In particular, CVA reaches the maximum when the threshold is infinite 
representing no collateral arrangement. 
We extend our analysis to other CSA portfolios. The results hold across different CSA 
counterparties and collateral agreements. Our findings show that collateral posting can reduce credit risk 
and CVA. The results also suggest a negative correlation between collateralization and CVA as an 
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increase in collateralization causes a decrease in CVA charge and vice-versa. These findings improve our 
understanding of the relationship between collateralization and CVA. 
 
Impact of collateralization on market risk 
We study how collateralization impacts market risk by gauging VaR changes due to collateral 
arrangements. VaR is the regulatory measurement for assessing market risk. It is defined as the maximum 
loss likely to be suffered on a portfolio for a given probability defined as a confidence level over a given 
period time. In its most popular form, VaR measures 10-day 99
th
 percentile of potential loss that can be 
incurred.  
There are three commonly used methodologies to calculate VaR – parametric, historical 
simulation and Monte Carlo simulation. Parametric model estimates VaR directly from the standard 
deviation of portfolio returns typically assuming returns are normally distributed. Historical simulation 
calculates VaR from the distribution of actual historical returns. Whilst Monte Carlo simulation computes 
VaR from a distribution constructed from random outcomes. In this paper, we calculate historical VaR. 
For monitoring market risk, many organizations segment portfolios in some manner. They may 
do so by traders and trading desks. Typically, a market risk portfolio contains derivatives across multiple 
counterparties, while a counterparty portfolio comprises transactions among different traders and trading 
desks. We arbitrarily select a trading portfolio and then partition it into single-counterparty sub-portfolios. 
One sub-portfolio contains 172 interest rate swaps, 68 caps and floors, 25 European swaptions and 17 
cancelable swaps. 
First, we compute the VaR of the sub-portfolio without considering credit risk. The calculated 
result as of May 11, 2012 is -386,570. Here the VaR is a negative value by definition. However, the 
industry convention is to report VaR as a positive number that is the amount of money one can lose. Thus, 
people in the market usually say that the VaR is 386,570 in this case. This convention can be confusing in 
places. If one says that VaR increases, the numbers actually become smaller or move into the left tail. 
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For many reasons, both historical and practical, market and credit risk have often been treated as 
if they are unrelated source of risk: the risk types have been measured separately, managed separately, 
and economic capital against each risk type has been assessed separately.  
However, market risk and credit risk actually reinforce each other. Default-induced credit losses 
can be driven by market price changes. At the same time, the changes in prices depend on the rating 
migration or increase in the default perception of the firm. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(see BCBS [2009]) also finds that those banks that were more severely affected in the global financial 
crisis measured their market and credit risk separately, whereas banks that used an integrated approach to 
market and credit risk measurement were much less impacted. Measuring market risk without considering 
credit risk may mask the significant impact of credit risk and often leads to underestimation of risk. 
Therefore, we further calculate VaR by taking credit risk into account. Let us first assume that 
there is no CSA agreement. Each trade is valued by the risky model developed by Xiao [2015]. The VaR 
with credit risk is computed as -418,948. It can be seen that VaR has increased from 386,570 to 418,948 
after accounting for credit risk. The above empirical results show that market fluctuation has a larger 
impact on VaR when credit risk is taken into account. Our research highlights the linkage between market 
and credit risk.  
Next, we measure VaR again by considering both counterparty credit risk and collateralization. 
Assume that there is a CSA arrangement. The VaR values under different effective collateral thresholds 
are displayed in Exhibit 10. 
 
Exhibit 10. Impact of Collateralization on VaR 
This exhibit shows that VaR increases with collateral threshold. The infinite collateral threshold is 
equivalent to no collateral agreement and the zero-value collateral threshold corresponds to full 
collateralization.  
Effective Threshold  0 2.1 Million 4.1 Million 6.1 Mil Infinite ( ) 
VaR -386,570 -398,235 -404,401 -410,756 -418,950 
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Exhibit 10 tells us that collateral posting actually can reduce VaR. The results show that market 
risk exposure rises as collateral threshold increases. In particular, VaR reaches the maximum when the 
threshold is infinite representing no collateral arrangement. We come to the same conclusion after 
repeating this test for other portfolios.  
Our findings suggest that there are important interactions between market and credit risk. We find 
a positive correlation between market and credit risk as they increase or decrease together. We also find 
that collateralization is actually negatively correlated with market risk, i.e., an increase in collateralization 
causes a drop in market risk. Said differently, collateral posting can reduce market risk. Our research 
contributes to the understanding of the interaction between market and credit risk. 
 
Conclusion 
This article addresses an important topic of the impact of collateralization on valuation and risk. 
We present a new model for pricing collateralized financial contracts based on the fundamental principal 
and legal structure of CSA. The model can back out market prices. This is very useful for pricing 
outstanding collateralized derivatives. 
Empirically, we use a unique proprietary dataset to measure the effect of collateralization on 
pricing and compare it with model-implied prices. The empirical results show that the model-implied 
prices are quite close to the market-quoted prices, suggesting that the model is fairly accurate on pricing 
collateralized derivatives. 
We find strong evidence that counterparty credit risk alone plays a significant but not 
overwhelming role in determining credit-related spreads. Only the joint effect of collateralization and 
credit risk has high explanatory power on unsecured credit costs. This finding suggests that failure to 
properly account for collateralization may result in significant mispricing of derivatives. 
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We also find evidence that there is a strong linkage between market and credit risk. Our research 
results suggest that banks and regulators need to think about an integrated framework to capture material 
interactions of these two types of risk. This requires all profits and losses are gauged in a consistent way 
across risk types as they tend to be driven by the same economic factors. Our finding leads to an 
improved understanding of the interaction between market and credit risk and how this interaction is 
related to risk measurement and management. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: The binomial default rule considers only two possible states: default or 
survival. For a discrete one-payment period ),( Tt  economy, at time T, the contract either defaults with 
the default probability ),( Ttq  or survives with the survival probability ),( Ttp . The survival value is the 
promised payoff TX  and the default payment is  )()()( TCXTTC T  . The value of this collateralized 
contract is the discounted expectation of all the payoffs and is given by   
   tFTTC XTtpTCXTTCTtqTtDEtV ),())()(()(),(),()(           (A1) 
 The collateral posted at time t is defined in (5). The value of the collateral at time T becomes 
),(/)()( TtDtCTC  , where we consider the time value of money only for collateral assets.  
If )()( tHtV C  , we have )()()( tHtVtC C   and 
  ),(/)(1),()(),(/)()( TtITTtqtHTtItVtV NC         (A2) 
where  ),()(),(),(),( TtqTTtpTtDTtI  ,  tF),(),( TtIETtI  , and  tFTN XTtIEtV ),()(  . 
In this case, )()( tHtV C   is equivalent to )()( tHtV
N  . 
 If )()( tHtV C  , we have 0)( tC  and 
)()()( tHtVtV NC                                       (A3) 
 Combining the two cases of )()( tHtV C   and )()( tHtV C  , we get 
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  ),(/)(1),()(),(/)(1)(1)(
)()()()(
TtITTtqtHTtItVtVtV N
tHtV
N
tHtV
C
NN       (A4) 
or 
  ),(),()( TtGXTtFEtV TC  tF     (A5a) 
where 
  ),(),(),(/11),(
)()()()(
TtDTtITtITtF
tHtVtHtV NN 
     (A5b) 
  ),(/)(1),()(1),(
)()(
TtITTtqtHTtG
tHtV N


           (A5c) 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let 0Tt  . On the first payment day 1T , let )( 1TV
C  denote the CSA 
value of the contract excluding the current cash flow 1X . According to Proposition 1, the CSA value of 
the contract at t is given by 
   ),()(),()( 101110 TTGTVXTTFEtV CC  tF                 (A6) 
Similarly, we have 
   ),()(),()( 2122211 1 TTGTVXTTFETV TCC  F    (A7) 
 Note that ),( 10 TTF  and ),( 10 TTG  are 1TF -measurable. According to the taking out what is 
known and tower properties of conditional expectation, we have 
  
     
   
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  (A8) 
 By recursively deriving from 2T  forward over mT , where mm
C XTV )( , we obtain 
              10 110 11 10 1 ),(),(),()( mi iiij jjmi iij jjC TTGTTFEXTTFEtV tt FF  (A9) 
where 

 

1
0 1
1),(
i
j jj
TTF  is an empty product when 0i . 
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